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SURVEY OF OHIO LAW -1957

CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
Jurisdiction
The court of common pleas is a court of general jurisdiction in criminal matters, but its jurisdiction is completely subject to legislative de-

terminatiom' Specific legislation therefore determines whether its jurisdiction is general or special in any given situation. State v. Krauss2 held
that the jurisdiction of the court of common pleas is special and limited
with respect to revocation of probation, and a proceeding of this type
must comply with all statutory requirements to be valid. In the -principal case the court revoked probation without according the accused any
hearing whatever, and its order revoking probation and imposing sentence
-was held to -be invalid. In the exercise of such limited jurisdiction the
record should show on its face compliance with the special statutory
requirements which include a hearing at which evidence may be subnitted, and if after the hearing an order revoking probation is made, it
must be 'based upon conduct of the accused in violation of the order.
The special problems arising from the assertion of jurisdiction by
"other courts inferior to the court of appeals" 3 led to several reported
decisions. The court of appeals granted an original'writ of.procedendo
in State v. Ferris.4 A mayor's court had tried several defendants for
violating Section 5577.04, Ohio Revised Code, ,prohibiting overweight
trucks upon the public highways and providing for possible imprisonment for 30 days as a part of the penalty, and had taken its decision
under advisement, having overruled a motion of defense counsel to dismiss. No written waiver of the right to jury trial or request for jury
trial had been filed by any defendant. The court held that the mayor's
court was without final jurisdiction in the prosecution and that its func-

tion was solely that of a committing magistrate.
State v. Keefe5 decided two important jurisdictional issues. The
petition filed in the court of common pleas asked for a writ of prohibi1

OHio CONST. art IV § 4, reads: 'The jurisdiction of the courts of common pleas,
and of the Judges thereof, shall be fixed by law."
'103 Ohio App. 209, 145 N.E.2d 131 (1957). OIo REv. CODE § 2951.09, accords the defendant on probation the right to a judical inquiry at which evidence may
be received and considered by the judge in determining whether conditions of probation have been violated justifying termination of the probation.
"OHIO CONsT., art IV, § 1.
'102 Ohio App. 412, 140 N.E.2d 901 (1956). The effect of granting the writ is
to order the court to discharge the accused, or to recognize them to the proper court
with appropriate conditions for bail.
'141 NB.2d 248 (Ohio C.P. 1957).
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don to prevent a judge of the municipal court from proceeding to try a
case on the docket of that court, based on an affidavit charging relator
with violation of a city ordinance. At the outset, the jurisdiction of the
court of common pleas to grant the writ was challenged. The court held
that it had jurisdiction, citing the -fact that the court of common pleas
is the court of general original jurisdiction in all civil matters and most
criminal -prosecutions, carrying with it implied jurisdiction -to issue the
writ of prohibition on a concurrent basis with the Supreme Court and
the court of appeals. It concluded that present conditions rendered the
issuance of the writ appropriate since the lower court was inferior in
jurisdiction and was attempting to exercise power which it did not possess.
On the merits, the court held that the lower court lost jurisdiction when
the affidavit which initiated the prosecution was quashed. Nor could the
jurisdiction be reinstated through amendment of the affidavit.6
State v. King7 decided a jurisdictional issue of academic interest concerning the power of a municipal court to hear causes arising in a township outside the territorial limits of the court's jurisdiction where there
was a qualified justice of the peace and the offense was not one over
which a justice of the peace had county-wide jurisdiction. The court in
State v. Haycook8 held that J.P. court's judgment of conviction was null
and void where the affidavit on which defendant was tried charged a
failure to exhibit a fishing license and the evidence showed a failure to
have a fishing license. The court indicated also -that an imposition of
fine and costs for fishing without a license was void since the jurisdiction in such a case is limited to binding the case over to the grand jury.P
A J.P. court had no inherent power to punish for contempt. The
Ohio statutes gave a very restricted contempt power, and In re Sheldon1°
held that a 30-day sentence for failure to obey an order was not only
void for excessiveness but also for failure to hold the hearing required
by Ohio Revised Code, § 1907.23.:"
court pointed out that many Ohio cases had held that there was no authority
for amending an affidavit during trial, and further that no case had ever held that it
'The

could be amended after having been quashed. The effect of quashing was the loss of

all jurisdiction. The court was careful to indicate that the prosecuting witness could
file a new affidavit, starting a new prosecution.
166 Ohio St. 293, 142 N.E.2d 222 (1957).
s103 Ohio App. 183, 144 N.E.2d 890 (1957).
Conceivably similar issues of jurisdiction might arise in connection with the operation of the new county court system which has replaced the justice courts since January 1, 1958. The criminal jurisdiction of these courts is identical with the former
jurisdiction of the justice of the peace court. See OHIO REV. CODE 5 1907.012.
10 103 Ohio App. 436, 145 N.E.2d 673 (1957).

U This section was repealed effective January 1, 1958, but identical contempt powers
have been conferred on the new county courts. See OHo REV. CODE §§ 1907.171,
1907.181, 1907.191.
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Construction of Statutes Defining Crime
HoWc]Dn

Baas v. AlVis' 2 raised the question whether second degree murder is
an included offense in the crime of first degree murder predicated on
the killing of a -guard, set out in § 2901.03, Ohio Revised Code. It was
the claim of the petitioner that his imprisonment was void since he was
sentenced for a crime not included in his indictment. Drawing upon the
analogy of -firstdegree indictments for homicide committed by means of
poison and during attempts to rob, in which there had -been findings of
second degree, the court held that second degree murder is an included
offense in first degree -murder when the facts warrant it.
State v. Powell 3 recognized that intent or purpose to kill is an essential element of second degree murder in Ohio, but held that the failure
to use a deadly weapon was not conclusive of lack of intent to kill or
cause serious bodily harm. When an accused uses his fists in effecting an
escape from apprehension for possible theft and brutally beats a man who
lay on the ground senseless from previous fighting, such conduct will
support a charge of intentional and purposeful killing.
In State v. Robinette' 4 the indictment charged 'the defendant with
-the denial of an alleged statement in testimony before the grand jury.
The court held that the indictment did not charge perjury because the
alleged statements were not charged as material to any criminal cause
being investigated by the grand jury. The statute uses the -phrase "falsehood as to a material matter." This phrase refers to testimony before a
grand jury, material to a criminal offense being investigated by the
grand jury.
State v. Snider'5 is an example of the difficulty created by, and perhaps wisdom of the statutory evidence rule set out in the definition of
,perjury,16 requiring proof by two witnesses, or one witness and corroborating circumstances.
LARCENY

Larceny is defined in terms of "stealing,"' 7 and the use of the word
"steal" carries with it all the essential elements of the crime of larceny
' 140 N.E.2d 93 (Ohio C.P. 1956).
142 N.E.2d 244 (Ohio Ct. App. 1955).
"143 N.E.2d 186 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957).
"101 Ohio App. 507, 140 N.E.2d 427 (1956).
ILOHIO RE. CODE § 2945.62.
': Omno Rnv. CODE § 2907.20.
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it imports a wrongful taking, appropriation, and carrying away of the
property of another. The statute pertaining to the formal charging of
crime permits the charging of the offense of larceny by the single verb
"stole."' 8 If any other -language is used, it must include a charge of
wrongful taking, and asportation with intent -to appropriate without permission, and with a purpose to deprive the owner of the goods in question. The phrase "wilfully and unlawfully take" does not charge lar9
ceny.
EMBEZZLEMENT

State v. Kearns"0 required a construction of § 425.12, Ohio Revised
Code, governing the payment of an allowance to the prosecuting attorney for expenses incurred in performance of official duties and in the
furtherance of justice not otherwise provided for. The court was of the
opinion that this statute requires the prosecutor to keep this money separate from his own personal property and to use it only for the purpose
specified in the statute. Since the evidence established that the accused
used the larger part of such a payment to discharge a personal debt, the
court held that he converted public money in violation of § 2919.03,
Ohio Revised Code, and committed an act of embezzlement.
LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES
l

State v. Fleming resulted in a conviction for discharging firearms
with intent to wound. There was evidence presented from which the
jury could have -found a simple assault. The defense requested the trial
judge to charge on the "lesser included offenses" of assault, discharging
firearms and pointing firearms. The court charged only on the crime
of maliciously shooting with intent to wound. The court of appeals reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial because assault is an
included lesser offense of maliciously shooting with intent to wound.
There was only one error in the lesser included offense charge, however,
because the offenses of discharging a firearm22 and aiming a firearm, s
while lesser offenses than the one charged in -the indictment, are not
offenses of the same general character. They are distinct and independent offenses of a different class.
'8 OHIO REV.CODE

§ 2941.07.

"In re Shelton, 103 Ohio App. 436, 145 N.E.2d 673 (1957).
0165 Ohio St. 573, 138 N.E.2d 650 (1956).
EState v. Fleming, 102 Ohio App. 546, 142 N.E.2d 546 (1957).
OHIO REV. CODE § 3773.21.
"OHIO REV. CODE § 3773.04.
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SUNDAY CLOSING LE.GISLATION

Two court of appeals decisions settled a number of questions about
the validity and applicability of this type of legislation. In State v. UL ir, 24 the court held that this legislation 25 prohibited all Sunday opening
of business places with the exceptions noted within the act itself. No
knowledge or intent to violate the law need therefore be alleged in the
complaint. Sunday closing legislation is -properly based on a valid exercise of the police power, and the exceptions provided within the statute
are not unreasonable. Since observance of one day out of seven as a day
of rest is a valid exercise of the police power, the legislature need not
assign a reason for choosing Sunday, rather than leaving it to an individual choice. State v. Keich26 held that the statute prohibited the
opening of a general store which offered for sale household items, automobile accessories, general merchandise, some patent medicines and sundry drug items. Such an establishment is not a business or work of
necessity.
ESCAPE

In 1955, State v. FerguXon2 7 held that the offense could not be committed by a person who had broken away from an illegal confinement
pending trial. The later case of Riebesehl v. AlvisW8 decided that the
offense had been committed by -the accused who had walked through
an unlocked jail door wherein he was being confined on a charge of
breaking and entering an inhabited dwelling.
TRAFFIC LAws

City of Akron v. Willingham29 dealt with the power of a municipal
court to suspend the driver's license of a person found guilty (pleading
guilty) of operating a motor vehicle in violation of a speed ordinance
very similar to the state speed law.30 The Supreme Court sustained the
suspension authority, holding that a law or ordinance prohibiting speeding creates an offense "relating to reckless operation" of a motor vehicle
"143 N.E.2d 849 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957). The court summarily rejected the argument that there was any impairment of freedom of religion.
SOrIo REv. CoDE § 3773.24.
"145 N.E.2d 532 (Ohio Ct App. 1956).
100 Ohio App. 191, 135 N.E.2d 884 (1955); see comment, 8 WEsT. REs. L REV.
220 (1957).
103 Ohio App. 311, 145 N.E.2d 207 (1957).
"166 Ohio St 337, 142 N.E.2d 653 (1957).
soOio REv.CODE § 4511.21. This section 'contains the "reasonable and proper"
and the "assured dear distance ahead" tests, together with the prima fade lawful
speed limits.
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within the meaning of § 4507.34, Ohio Revised Code, which authorizes
suspension or revocation as to any person convicted or pleading guilty
to such an offense, for a -period up to one year.
City of Toledo v. Soldier' held that the "due regard" ordinance and
the "speed" ordinance of the city created separate offenses. Evidence of
speed alone will not support a conviction under an affidavit based on the
"due regard" ordinance. The latter ordinance is very similar to the state
32
statute on the same subject.
State v.Hale3 3 decided that the definition of "under the influence of
intoxicating liquor" as used in the traffic code34 was not controlled by a
definition of intoxicating liquor contained in § 4301.01, Ohio Revised
Code.35 Since all the testimony introduced by the state indicated that the
defendant was beyond a doubt, under the influence of alcohol, the conviction was affirmed.
TEST OF OBSCENITY

An ordinance of the City of Cincinnati dealing with the sale and
distribution of obscene materials, pictures, and publications came before
the municipal court for construction in Cincinnati v. Walton.36 In a
very carefully written opinion, Judge Bettman sought to define obscene
matter in such a manner as to come within the -pattern of the several United
States Supreme Court decisions dealing with the relationship of such
regulatory legislation to free speech and press. He adopted a two-fold
test: (1) The obscene material must be calculated to appeal to the
reader's or viewer's prurient interest, i.e., the material must 'be "dirt for
dirt's sake"; (2) the material must have a substantial tendency to excite
lustful desires or be material dealing .with sexual perversion. The judge
ruled further that individual pictures or stories in a magazine not related
101 Ohio App. 273, 139 NXE.2d 631 (1956).
'OHIo REv. CODE § 4511.20. In State v. Martin, 164 Ohio St. 54, 128 N.E.2d 7
(1955), the Ohio Supreme Court construed this section to mean that a person must
operate the named vehicle in the same manner as would a reasonable prudent person
under similar circumstances.
In the present court of appeals report, the court found that the defendant in the
operation of his automobile complied with this standard.
'140 N.E.2d 55 (Ohio Ct. App. 1955), aff'd, 165 Ohio St. 104, 133 NE.2d 104
(1956).
3' OHIO REV. CODE § 4511.19.
' Despite the literal applicability of this section to the entire code, the court looked
upon this section as referring exclusively and solely to the liquor control act and held
that this section has no reference to or application to any other civil or penal sections
of the code.
'

- 145 N.E.2d 407 (Ohio Munic. Ct., 1957).
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to the whole could be singled out and tested by these standards without
considering the magazine as a wholes3
MISCELLANEOUS OFFENSES

The Ohio criminal trespass (land or premises) statute s" is silent on
the matter of intent. State v. Larason" held that evidence of an apparent
technical obtrusion on land by the defendant with innocent belief that he
had a right to be there did not establish a violation. This substantially
requires the prosecution to offer .proof of intent to make out a prima
facie case.40
In State v. Hershberger,41 the accused was convicted of failing to
cause his children to attend school, and the trial court fined him and ordered him to give -bond in the sum of $250 -to keep the peace for two
years. The court of appeals modified the judgment to the extent of requiring the accused to give a bond in the sum of $100. It held that the
special bond section under the compulsory education laws 42 was controlling over the general recognizance statute43 under which the trial judge
required the accused to enter into the peace bond in question.
State v. Rudy44 affirmed a conviction of the accused for violating
-the special assault statute, § 2903.01, Ohio Revised Code, which protects a child under the age of 16. The court applied this statute to acts
committed against a male child under that age, in accordance with a
prior construction of the statute in this case.45
Since § 901-13, Code of Ordinances of Cincinnati, did not deal separately with the
problem of sales or exhibitions to minors, the court ruled out of consideration all
evidence as to the effect on minors to avoid any possible invalidity which might flow
from the decision in Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
Applying his tests to the evidence presented, namely the pictures, magazines, etc.,
the judge found as a fact that certain of them (named) were obscene, and therefore
found the accused guilty.
The comparable state statutes are OIo REy. CODE § 2905.34, dealing with sales
and other offerings generally and also specifically to minors: § 2905.341 and §
2905.342. Also exclusively as to minors: § 2903.10 and § 2903.11.
21Omo REv. CODiE § 2909.21.
143 N.X.2d 502 (Ohio C.P. 1956).
"The present statute varies considerably from the former GENERAL CODE, § 12522,
which originally required that unlawful entry be first forbidden.
" 103 Ohio App. 188, 144 N.E.2d 693 (1955).
2Orio
REv. CODE § 3321.38 (a).
"OHIO Rnv. CODE § 2947.16.
'*101 Ohio App. 241, 139 N.E.2d 81 (1954).

"The indictment was held good against a demurrer in State v. Rudy, 162 Ohio St.
362, 123 N.E.2d 426 (1954); 1955 Survey, 7 WEsT. REs. L. REv. 265, 268
(1956).
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In State v. Silberberg,46 land owners had purchased for personal occupancy undivided but specifically designated resident units in a multiple
residence real estate project; title to the entire building project was to
be taken in the name of a corporation and each unit owner was to have
stock according to the value of his ownership in the project. The court
held that the agreements among these landowners were contracts for the
sale of real estate and not "securities" within the meaning of the Ohio
Securities Act.47 The court indicated that the nature of the transaction
was -greatly influenced by the individual control which the "shareholder"
had over the property. This factor determined whether the interest
was an investment or a real estate transaction.

Criminal Procedure
LIIITATiONS ON MUNICIPAL MISDE MEANORS
The 1955 Cincinnati Earned Income Tax Ordinance provided for
prosecution of violators within 10 years after the occurrence of any violation. Accused was prosecuted for failure to file a return within one
year and three months of the violation. Since the state law 4" provided a
period of one year, the facts in C inwai v. Faig4" directly raised an
issue of possible conflict between the ordinance and a general law of the
state. The court, following the views50 of the Supreme Court and the
court of appeals that a conflict in the provisions of a statute and an ordinance is not alone sufficient to invalidate the ordinance, held that the
10 year "limitations" provision of the income tax ordinance was valid
and convicted the accused. This holding is consistent with the decisions
that a more severe -penalty in an ordinance than that provided for by
" 166 Ohio St. 101, 139 N.E.2d 342 (1956): for a report of the court of appeals
decision, see 1956 Survey, 8 WEsT. REs. L. REv. 286 (1957).

'tOmio REv. CODE §51707.01-.03.
'8 OHIo REv. CODE 5 1905.33.
'o145 N.E.2d 563 (Ohio Munic. Ct. 1957).
r° There is a general statement in Village of Struthers v. Sokol, 108 Ohio St. 263, 140

N.E. 519 (1923) that a police ordinance is not in conflict with a general law upon
the same subject merely because certain specific acts are declared unlawful by the
ordinance, which acts are not referred to in the general law, or because certain specific acts are omitted in the ordinance but referred to in the general law, even though
greater penalties are imposed by the municipal ordinance. In re Calhoun, 87 Ohio
App. 193, 94 N.E.2d 388 (1949) states the general proposition that "conflicts with
the general laws is not determined by the penalties prescribed but rather whether
the ordinance permits or licenses that which the statute prohibits and forbids, and
vice versa." This decision sustained a conviction of assault and battery under an ordinance which provided for a punishment in excess of the general rule set out in
OHIO REv. CODE § 715.67 (formerly OHIO GEN. CODE § 3628), and in excess of

the state penalty for that offense provided by OHIo REv. CODE § 2901.25.
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general law does not bring the ordinance into conflict with the provisions
of Art. XVII, § 3 of the Ohio Constitution, although there has been
some disagreement on this point among the various courts of appeals.&51
Grand Jury Proceedings
In Wickine v.Alis,52 the court of appeals rejected petitioner's contention that his sentence upon a murder indictment was void because allegedly incompetent testimony was heard by the grand jury. In fulfilling its function as an inquirer, the grand jury does not exercise a judicial
function and the courts in Ohio lack the power, even in a direct attack,
to inquire into the legality or sufficiency of the evidence on which an
indictment is based.
INDIC

iMENTs AND AFFDAVITS

After an accused had been tried, convicted, and sentenced to the Ohio
Penitentiary, it was discovered that the indictment was not executed in
accordance with the requirements of the statute. The signature of the
grand jury foreman was not subscribed after the words "a true bill." In
Kennedy v. Alvis,53 the accused obtained his release from imprisonment
through a habeas corpus proceeding which urged the court to declare the
indictment a nullity. The Code54 requirement of the foreman's signature
was held mandatory and the only feasible way under Ohio law for certifying that the Grand Jury had indicted the accused as provided by law.
State v. Wfliams5 5 raised the issue of whether an indictment charging
a felony should be drawn with at least the factual allegations, required by
statute, of an affidavit and warrant charging a misdemeanor. In holding
that the indictment need not be so specific, the court pointed out that an
See City of Cleveland v. Betts, in which the court of appeals apparently held that a
municipal ordinance applying to concealed weapons which provided a penalty of a
misdemeanor when the state statute provided for punishment as a felony, was invalid.
See Cleveland News, March 13, 1958. On the other hand, City of Toledo v. Kohlholler, 96 Ohio App. 355, 122 N.E.2d 20 (1954) sustained a municipal ordinance
which provided a misdemeanor penalty for its violation when the state statute punishing a similar offense prescribed a felony.
In City of Youngstown v. Evans, 121 Ohio St. 342, 168 N.E. 144 (1929), the
court's opinion states that OHIO GEN. CODE § 3628, is not a law defining offenses
and prescribing punishment within the meaning of OHio CONST., art XVIII, § 3,
since an alleged conflict must relate to a state law applicable to the same subject
matter.
103 Ohio App. 1, 144 N.E.2d 207 (1957).
145 N.E.2d 361 (Ohio C.P. 1957).
r'OHIO Rnv. CODE § 2939.20. The court held that §§ 2941.08, 2941.29, and
2941.54 were inapplicable to a void indictment.
' 145 N.E.2d 245 (Ohio C.P. 1957).
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accused under indictment for felony is entitled to a bill of particulars
more specifically setting out the nature of the offense charged. An indictment is not subject to a motion to quash if it contains a statement
that the accused has committed a public offense, which statement is in
ordinary and concise language or in the words of the enactment, or in any
words sufficient to give the accused notice of the offenses of which he is
charged.56
In State v. Porcaro,57 the accused was charged in a single count indictment with burglary of an inhabited dwelling and grand larceny on
the night of May 30, 1948, at the hour of 5:00 o'clock. Otherwise the
indictment followed the statutory form for charging the offense. The
court held that an indictment which charged the offenses in substantially
the form prescribed -by statute was not demurrable, and with the offense
properly charged, the statement of the hour should :be treated as surplus, age or at most an immaterial variance. The court also held that the
general rule against joining two offenses in the same count does not
apply to an indictment for burglary and for larceny committed while
perpetrating the burglary.
In State v. Patty,58 the defendant was convicted of acting in a manner
tending to cause the delinquency of a minor, the affidavit charging immoral and indecent conduct. Nowhere did the affidavit charge that the
minor was a delinquent. The court held that it was not necessary to
,charge the minor with being a delinquent when the charge against the
adult was "acting in a manner tending to cause the delinquency" of a
minor.
Under Art. I, § 10, Ohio Constitution, an accused is entitled to have
an affidavit which charges him with an offense and describes the offense
sufficiently to set out its nature. This requirement is generally met
when the affidavit charges an offense in the language of the statute defining the crime. But in any case, a defendant who goes to -trial on a
plea of not guilty without objecting to the form or substance of the affidavit waives his right to demand sufficient averments in the charge. 59
OH-Io REv. CODE § 2941.05, seems to authorize alternative methods of charging
an offense in an indictment or information. State v. Yudick, 155 Ohio St. 269, 98
N.E.2d 415 (1951) gave literal application to its provisions in sustaining an indictment challenged for legal suffidency.
" 102 Ohio App. 128, 141 N.E.2d 482 (1956).
5'102 Ohio App. 18, 140 N.E.2d 804 (1956).
'Toledo v. Soldier, 101 Ohio App. 273, 139 N.E.2d 631 (1956). The court held
in this case that the evidence tended to show a violation of speed alone whereas the
affidavit attempted to charge an offense under the due regard ordinance. For this
variance, the judgment of conviction was reversed.
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In Hasselwortb v.Alms,"° the accused was indicted -for burglary in
the night season of an uninhabited dwelling. A plea of guilty was en.
tered to an unlawful breaking and entering in the daytime, and the court
amended the indictment by striking out the word "night" and substituting the word "day." This amendment changed the identity of the offense,
and the accused was illegally imprisoned. He was discharged on a writ
of habeas corpus.
RIGHT OF COUNSEL

In State v.Alvts,61 the petitioner was urging that he had been deme4
his constitutional rights because counsel was not appointed for the .pre
liminary hearing before a mayor. Since it appeared that the Code Sec;
tion 2 which provides for the appointment of counsel after the serving
of indictment or opportunity -for receiving it had been afforded, was
seasonably observed, the charge was not supported, and there was no
denial of any constitutional rights.
While a defendant's plea of guilty raises a presumption of a waiver
of his right to have counsel, the presumption may be rebutted 'by the
6
record and special facts. State v. Porcaro
3 involved such a situation.
It
appeared upon arraignment that the accused was insane, and the judge
entered a plea of not guilty for him, ordering that he be committed to
the Lma State Hospital for examination and report. This commitment
was later made indefinite, until his reason was restored. About 9 months
later, accused was released and returned to the court. He then changea
his plea to guilty and was sentenced for his crimes. The record did not
indicate that he was ever advised 'by the court of his constitutional rights,
including the right to counsel when unable to employ professional advice. The court -held that the record in the case tended to rebut the presumption that due -process under the Federal and Ohio Constitutions was
accorded to the accused.
In State v.Ray, 4 the accused contended that he was prejudiced by
the appearance of private counsel, hired 'by the prosecuting witness, to
assist the prosecution. Since no complaint was made of the conduct ot
the private attorney, there was no showing of any -prejudice. The court
stated that itis a sound policy of law which permits the appearance of
143 N.E.2d 862 (Ohio Ct App. 1956). The court held that the two offenses were
separate and distinct; the proper procedure would have been to procure an indictment
charging breaking and entering in the daytime before entering the plea of guilty.
140 N.E.2d 59 (Ohio Ct. App. 1952)
'OHIo REV. CODE 5 2941.50.
102 Ohio App. 128, 141 N.E.2d 482 (1956)
102 Ohio App. 395, 143 N.E.2d 484 (1956).
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private counsel, especially in courts of limited jurisdiction, when both
the public and the individual litigants are likely to be benefited by his
presence.
Double Jeopardy
In Washington Court House v. Carson,65 the accused had been tried
once for violating a municipal ordinance prohibiting driving under the
influence of intoxicating liquor. During the course of that trial, the
municipal court granted a motion of the city to dismiss without prejudice
to a future action. A new affidavit was then filed and a second prosecution instituted which resulted in a conviction. Accused had moved to
dismiss the new affidavit for the reason that he had been placed in jeopardy under the prior affidavit, which was overruled. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment on the ground that there was no jeopardy
under the first affidavit because that instrument was void for failure to
state an offense and there was never any jeopardy under it.
Pleas
66

Craft v. A/iis was an original habeas corpus proceeding in the court
of appeals. Petitioner sought release because of the alleged inability to
plead guilty to second degree murder under an indictment which charged
first degree murder. Reasoning by analogy to the cases in which convictions of lesser degrees of homicide under indictments which charged
-first degree murder had been sustained, the court denied the application
and held the plea proper.
Change of Venue
6

State v. Tannyhill" held that an application for change of venue was
not substantiated by a showing of substantial newspaper and radio publicity of a factual nature concerning the crime for which the accused was
being tried. The court indicated that the -grant or denial of the motion
lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, and a record which
does not show inability to obtain a fair and impartial trial contains no
143 N.E.2d 853 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956), appeal dismissed, 166 Ohio St. 248, 141
N.E.2d 175 (1957); cert. denied, 355 U.S. 270 (1957).
The opinion by the
municipal judge suggested that the accused could not attack the second affidavit because she had moved to dismiss the first for insufficiency. It should be noted, however, that the court overruled that motion, but later granted the city's motion based
on the same ground.
140 N.E.2d 61 (Ohio Ct. App. 1954).
101 Ohio App. 466, 140 N.E.2d 332 (1956), appeal dismissed, 165 Ohio St. 482,
135 N.E.2d 765 (1956).
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prejudicial error as to denial of a change of venue. The court indicated
that the most important factor for the court to consider on the motion
is whether a fair and impartial jury can be obtained in the county in
which the offense is alleged to have 'been commited. 68

Jury Trial
69

State v. Hershberger was an appeal from a judgment of guilty of
failing to cause the defendant's children to attend school The juvenile
court tried the case and imposed the maximum fine of $20 after defendant had formally demanded a trial by jury. The denial of a jury was
correct under § 2945.17, Ohio Revised Code, which provides a statutory
right to trial by jury except in cases in which the penalty does not exceed
the sum of $50.
Nor is a first offender charged with violating the Sunday dosing
law7" entitled to a trial by jury. State v. Keich71 held that there was no
denial of any constitutional right in refusing a trial by jury, relying upon
the cases which hold that there is no constitutional right to trial by jury
under the Ohio Constitution where the punishment is by fine only.
State v. Mays72 considered several questions concerning the impaneling of a jury. In the course of a trial of the accused for violation of the
Ohio narcotics law, defense counsel moved prior to the voir dire examination to dismiss the jurors summoned on the ground that there were
among the panel, persons who had participated in the trial of another
' This decision was rendered prior to the decision of the Supreme Court in State v.
Sheppard, 165 Ohio St. 293, 135 N.E.2d 340 (1956). That decision amply confirms the soundness of the position of the court of appeals. The Sheppard decision
established three propositions on the matter of change of venue in criminal cases:
(1) ordering a change in venue lies in the discretion of the trial court; (2) refusing
to order a change of venue without prejudice until it can be determined :whether a
fair and impartial jury can be impaneled is not an abuse of discretion; (3) denying
the motion to change is not error where a jury is obtained from the special panel of
prospective jurors where only 14 are excused because of having formed a firm opinion and before accused has exercised all of his peremptory challenges, is not an abuse
of discretion. See 1956 Survey, 7 WEST. REs. L. REv. 293, 294 (1957).
In the principal case, 12 regular and two alternate jurors were obtained. Most
of them had very little knowledge of the details; several had formed undisclosed
opinions which they declared on the voir dire would not not influence them in the
trial of the case. No challenges for cause were overruled; 52 were excused having
formed a fixed opinion; five were excused for disbelief in capital punishment; six
others were excused for health or physical reasons; four had used or were using counsel in the case. The accused's peremptory challenges were not exhausted.
eo 103 Ohio App. 188, 144 N.E.2d 693 (1955).
0 On-o Rnv. CODE § 3773.24. The punishment for the first offender under 5
3773.99 (P) is a maximum fine of $25.00.
' 145 N.E.2d 532 (Ohio Cr. App. 1956).
" 139 NE.2d 639 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956).
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defendant involving a similar charge and the same witnesses. This motion was overruled. Upon voir dire the panel was asked questions concerning the crime charged and their attitude toward the presumption of
innocence and necessity of the state proving all elements of the crime.
To these questions there was no audible answer but none of these former
jurors were challenged for cause. Three were challenged peremptorily
and the final jury selected had four members who had participated in
the trial of the other defendant who had been found guilty. The judge
did not participate in examination of the jurors as to their qualifications.
The court of appeals found no error in the proceedings incident to the
selection of the jury. It indicated that broad discretion is conferred on
the court in these preliminaries, including the matter of personal examination of the jurors, and an abuse of discretion on which to predicate error
must clearly appear. The court found no indication of abuse in
the record, especially in view of defendant's failure to challenge for cause
and in view of the established practice to use a venire continuously during the term for which it is called.
Evidence
State v. Brown73 considered the question of the propriety of granting
a defendant's motion to dismiss and the burden of proof under the defense of alibi. Where there is any substantial evidence that a crime has
been committed by the defendant, the question of his guilt or innocence
must be submitted to the jury; only when there is no evidence to establish all the essential elements of the crime charged may the trial court sustain a motion of the defendant for dismissal.
While it was apparent that the jury did not believe the witnesses
used to prove the alibi, the court properly told the jury that the defendant did not have the burden of proof of establishing his alibi beyond a
reasonable doubt, nor by a preponderance of the evidence, but if the
proof of the alibi raised a reasonable doubt in their minds concerning his
guilt he should be acquitted.
State v. Titak74 decided several questions about the admissibility of
physical tests relative to the defendant who had been convicted of driving
under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The defendant granted permission to a police officer to conduct an intoxi-meter test on him, although the accused was not warned that the result of the test might be
used against him at his trial. The trial court allowed the results of the
intoxi-meter test to go to the jury, and covered the consideration and
102 Ohio App. 113, 141 N.E.2d 686 (1956).
144 N.E.2d 255 (Ohio Ct. App. 1955).
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weight of this evidence in his general charge, leaving the weight and
credit of this evidence as well as all other evidence in the case to the
determination of the jury. On the first objection, the court held that it
was not a violation of a constitutional right to make the test when willingly submitted to by 'the accused although without a warning of its
possible incriminating use. Submission of the results of the test along
with all the other evidence under the general charge was not error, especially since there was ample evidence aside from the test from which the
jury could have found the accused guilty.
Another "driving while intoxicated" prosecution presented an interesting question concerning the limits of cross-examination of an accused
who v'oluntarily testifies. The Code75 authorizes a showing of the witness's conviction of other crimes for the purpose of affecting his credibility. In State v. Hickman,76 there was cross-examination of the accused
pursuant to this statute as well as under the statute7 authorizing the admittance of evidence of like acts of the accused, previously committed,
which are so related to the offense charged, in character and point of
time, as tend to show intent, motive, habit or state of mind of the accused
at the time he committed the offense charged. The questions related to
prior arrests and convictions for violations of a city ordinance prohibiting
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor. The court held that evidence of other convictions, to be admissible under the two statutes, must come within the designation of the
crimen falsi of the common law. 8 Former convictions involving violations of city ordinances is not evidence of this character.
79 held that the conviction of the accused for contribState v.MiWa
Oro RLzv. CODE § 2945.42.
" 102 Ohio App. 78, 141 N.E.2d 202 (1956).
'7OHIO REv. CODE § 2945.59.
71

' The showing of treason, felony, or any of the crimen falsi was permissible to disqualify a witness at common law. This disqualification was removed by statute
(OHIo REv. CODE § 2945.42), but the same kind of criminal conduct can be shown
under the statute to affect the credibility of the witness. A leading case is Kornreich
v. Industrial Fire Insurance Co., 132 Ohio St. 78, 5 N.E.2d 153 (1936) in which the
opinion states that "Crimen falsi was characterized as any crime which might injuriously affect the administration of justice by the introduction of falsehood and fraud."

In this case, a formal confession of arson was considered the equivalent of a conviction of such an offense.
Also, the cross-examination must be confined to showing conviction of crimen
falsi. Evidence of indictment alone is inadmissible. See Wagner v. State, 115 Ohio
St. 136, 152 N.E. 28 (1926).
" 140 N.E.2d 596 (Ohio Ct.App. 1957). Briefly, a 15-year-old girl came into Cleveland Central police station at midnight under the obvious influence of intoxicating
liquor which allegedly had been consumed, among other places, at the establishment
of which the accused was the manager. A police officer and a policewoman obtained
the consent of the girl to accompany an older man to the bar managed by the ac-
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uting to -the delinquency of a minor should be reversed. Two judges concurred in the judgment of reversal but for different reasons. The dissenting judge felt that the evidence was competent and that the conviction
should be affirmed. One of the concurring judges felt that the evidence
was inadmissible because of the manner in which it had been procured;
the other expressed the view that there was no affirmative or positive
evidence to support a charge of contributing to the delinquency of the
child within the meaning of the Ohio statutes.
There were the usual number of cases in which convictions were
either sustained80 or reversed 8l on the question of the overall sufficiency
of the evidence presented in the particular cases.
Instructions
82

The statute regulating written charges contemplates that counsel's
request be made at the conclusion of the evidence and that the charges
be reduced to writing on the request of either party. It permits deviation from the order of procedure set out therein. In State v. Fleming,s
a prosecution for malicious shooting with intent to wound, the defendant
filed a written request with the clerk of court several days before the
commencement of trial requesting a written charge be given the jury
and that the charge include the elements of assault, discharging firearms,
and pointing firearms. The court followed the request to reduce the
charge to writing but it dealt only with the crime set out in the indictment. The court of appeals considered it a proper exercise of discretion
to deviate from the statutory routine with regard to the time for requesting charges to the jury, but upon considering the resume of the evidence,
determined that the lesser included offense of assault was an issue in the
cused where intoxicating liquor was served to the girl and her escort by a waitress.
The drink served the girl was promptly confiscated by police officers.
I State v. Hicks, 139 N.E.2d 689 (Ohio Ct. App. 1954) (receiving and concealing
stolen property, knowing it to have been stolen); State v. Franken, 140 N.E.2d 23
(Ohio Ct. App. 1955) (excessive speed under OHIo REV. CODE § 4511.21); State
v. Rucks, 141 N.E.2d 265 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956) (illegally possessing burglary
tools); State v. Moore, 139 N.E.2d 381 (Ohio C.P. 1956) (driving while under
influence of intoxicating liquor).
'City of Hamilton v. Hausenbein, 102 Ohio App. 556, 139 N.E.2d 459 (1956)
(unnecessary noise charge); City of Columbus v. Hohman, 144 N.E.2d 296 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1956) (ordinance regulating delivery of gasoline); State v. Jones, 145
N.E.2d 458 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956) (contributing to neglect of minor); State v.
Webb, 140 N.E.2d 802 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956) (charged with accepting a bribe);
City of Euclid v. General Motors Corporation, 140 N.E.2d 435 (Ohio Ct. App.
1957) (charged with violating ordinance prohibiting loud, disturbing and unnecessary noises).
OHo REv. CODE § 2945.10.
"102 Ohio App. 244, 142 N.E.2d 546 (1957).
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case. It was therefore error to refuse a charge on assault but not on the
other offenses because they were not lesser included offenses, being of a
different class.
In State v. Baldrige,8 4 the accused requested that special charges be
given the jury before argument. This request was denied, but the substance of these charges was included in the court's general charge. The
court of appeals held that the court could properly deny the request to
charge before argument, and that it had sufficiently included the requested charges in its later general charge to the jury. The appellate
court reminded counsel of the necessity of raising specific objections to
the general charge before the trial judge, in order to raise a question of
further omissions in the general charge, which was not done in this case.
An instruction is improper which leaves to the jury the consideration
of a matter on which there is no evidence. In State v. McDaniel,8 5 accused was tried under an indictment for first degree manslaughter, and
the only evidence presented on the issue of the accused being the aggressor was against such a theory. It was therefore error for the court
to charge in such a way that the jury could draw an inference that the
defendant was the aggressor. Also the accused offered a plea of self defense which was corroborated by eyewitnesses. The court did correctly
state the obligation of the accused if the jury found the deceased in the
wrong. However, the court submitted the "reasonable person similarly
situated" test for the jury to use in considering the reasonableness of the
accused's belief in danger which would justify the use of deadly force in
defense. This latter submission was erroneous because the Ohio law entitles the accused to have the fear, which he asserts caused his use of
deadly force, measured by his own physical and mental constitution and
not by that of the hypothetical reasonable man.

Verdict
88

The Ohio statute governing procedure in the common pleas courts
provides that the jury must be sent out again for further deliberation
when the verdict in substance is defective. In State v. Hale,87 the jury
returned with a verdict upon a form which had been given it. The
trial judge examined the verdict, and found that it was improper, not
conforming to the charge. He explained the matter to the jurors, presented proper forms of verdict to them, and directed them to conduct
U144 N.E.2d

656 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956).
" 103 Ohio App. 163, 144 NE.2d 683 (1956).
"OIo REV. CODE § 2315.10. Quaere: Does this statute have any relevance to
criminal
procedure?
"7140 N.2d 55 (Ohio Ct. App. 1955).
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further deliberations. They later returned a verdict of guilty in proper
form. The court of appeals held that the judge's action was authorized
by the statute.
State v. Baldridge88 considers the time at which a jury ceases to have
any official status. The jury had returned its verdict, and defendant had
waived polling, the judge and prosecutor had thanked the jury. The
court then asked counsel for defendant if they had anything to say, and
they declined. Thereupon the foreman of the jury arose and asked permission to make a statement. This was refused and the refusal was assigned as error. The court reasoned that the jury had terminated its
duties when it returned its verdict and announced it. There was therefore no prejudicial error in denying permission to make a statement.
Sentence
89

The Ohio Criminal Code establishes certain prerequisites to passing
sentence, including the asking of the accused whether he has anything to
say as to why judgment should not be pronounced against him. This requirement applies to a defendant found guilty of a misdemeanor. 90 This
procedure is mandatory, and unless observed, the trial court will be reversed and the case remanded for resentencing only, provided there is no
other error apparent on the record.
The Ohio Criminal Code 9 ' also requires the clerk to supply a mittimus, including a copy of the sentence and indictment to accompany every
convicted felon to the place of imprisonment. In Stewart v. AlVis,0 2 the
defendant claimed that he was illegally imprisoned because the judge did
not sign the journal entry. The court never signed any written sentence
or journal entry in this case. It orally pronounced judgment and sentence, and the clerk entered the judgment and sentence in the journal.
The judgment was complete, and the accused was not entitled to release
on habeas corpus. A collateral point in this case was whether it was
necessary that the defendant be present in the event that the journal record in the trial court needed to be completed or corrected. Physical presence of the defendant is not necessary. Foglio v. Alvis"3 is a similar
holding. In Reiter v. AlVis, 9 4 an original writ of habeas corpus was filed
-' 144 N.E.2d 656 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956).
'

8 OHio

REv. CODE

§

2947.05.

' City of Columbus v. Shuffelt, 139 N.E.2d 488 (Ohio C.P. 1956).
9'

OHIO REV. CODE

144
143
144
cision
'

§ 2949.12.

N.E.2d 907 (Ohio C.P. 1957).
N.E.2d 641 (Ohio C.P. 1957).
N.E.2d 902 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957). This court refuses to accept its own dein the much publicized but unreported case of Dean v. Alvis, No. 5590.
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in the court of appeals. The ground asserted for release was the lack of
a signed entry issued to the clerk ordering that the sentence pronounced
orally in court be journalized. The court dismissed the writ, concluding
that the petitioner had pursued an improper remedy to correct any alleged
errors in the proceeding. Since the judgment had been journalized, the
failure of the judge to sign the entry was at most erroneous and not subject to collateral attack.
In re Shelton, 5 previously discussed in connection with another matter, held that a trial court in sentencing a defendant for violation of the
larceny statute had no power to impose any sentence other than that provided in the statute. Therefore, that part of the sentence which ordered
the defendant to "produce" the thing stolen (a pistol) was void.
State v. Westlake"6 raised a question of the power of the court of
common pleas to modify a sentence in a criminal case after the term at
which the judgment was entered and with the sentence already in effect.
The court held that it had no jurisdiction until the first order was set
aside. It could not set aside the first order because a court has no power,
at a subsequent term, to vacate its prior judgments.
In State v. AlVis, 9 7 the accused argued for his release on a writ of
habeas corpus because he filed a plea of guilty to both counts against
him, and the trial judge referred the matter to the probation department,
and later another judge called him before the court, asked him the usual
statutory questions and sentenced him on both counts, with the direction
that they be imposed consecutively. The court indicated that the accused
had neither a constitutional nor statutory right to probation. It found
that the probation department and the court performed all duties required
of it under the law, held the sentence a valid order of the court and dismissed the writ of habeas corpus.
Referral to a probation officer is discretionary before passing sentence
on a plea of guilty. In Riebesehl v. Alvis,98 the accused pleaded guilty
to breaking and entering an inhabited dwelling and escaping from jail,
and was sentenced to the Ohio penitentiary without any referral to a
probation officer. The court commented on the severity of the sentence
on the basis of the defendant's record, but held that defendant had been
accorded due process, and dismissed the writ of habeas corpus.
103 Ohio App. 436, 145 N.E.2d 673 ((1957).
145 N.E.2d 501 (Ohio C.P. 1957). The motion was to modify a sentence from
assault with intent to rob to one of plain assault. The court indicated that it would
not modify on the merits even if it did have authority under the circumstances.
0 103 Ohio App. 38, 144 N.E.2d 223 (1957).
103 Ohio App. 311, 145 N.E.2d 207 (1957).
145 Ohio App. 128, 141 N.E.2d 482 (1956).
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9 indicated that the
The journal entry in the case of State v. Porcaro"
defendant was sentenced for violation of the burglary and larceny sections
of the Code. The entry did not specify the manner in which the sentences should be served. Though the judgment was reversed on another
ground, the court stated that there is a presumption that the court intended that the prisoner should serve the aggregate time of both sentences when the record is silent as to whether they should be served concurrently or cumulatively.

Probation and Parole
Because of the differences in the statutes governing these two subjects, radically different procedures are possible in effecting their revocation. State v. Krauss'00 discusses the essential requirements of the revocation of a probation oider and the limited jurisdiction of the court of
common pleas in hearing such a matter. The latter problem has been discussed earlier in this article. Ohio Revised Code, § 2951.99 provides that
the judge, before whom an arrested probationer is brought, shall immediately inquire into the conduct of the defendant and shall have the power
to terminate probation and impose the proper sentence. This section
accords the defendant, who is out on probation, the right to a judicial inquiry prior to termination of probation. Probation will be revoked if
the defendant has violated the conditions of his probation. The record
of the trial court must show compliance with the statutory requirements,
and when the order revoking probation is not based upon any conduct of
the defendant in violation of the probation order, the revocation is unauthorized.
The Supreme Court in In re Varner'01 discussed the rights of a convict to have a judicial inquiry into the procedure for revocation of his
parole by the Pardon and Parole Commission. Specifically, it held that
the legality of the revocation could not be tested by the writ of habeas
corpus, but its reasoning leads to the inference that there is no right to
any judicial review of any aspect of the parole proceedings. Without
expressing any opinion as to the soundness of the several court of appeals
decisions which have held that there must be a judicial hearing before
probation may be revoked, the court pointed out that the statutes governing probation proceedings lend support to this position. But on the contrary, the statutes governing parole proceedings are silent. Furthermore,
probation is court administered, while parole is administered by an au'O0
103 Ohio App. 209, 145 N.E.2d 131 (1957). The mandate to the trial court
was reversed, defendant discharged subject to the order of probation.
'1
166 Ohio St. 340, 142 N.E.2d 846 (1956).
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thorized administrative body. The following quotation expresses the essence of the court's position:
If under our statutes a convict has no right to a parole, it would seem
that he should have no right to contest what may be in substance a revocation of his parole (that is the commission's declaring him to be a parole
violator and determining that he should again be imprisoned) unless there
is a dear statutory expression of an intent to confer such a right upon him.
We find no such statutory expression.'a

Criminal Appeals
FILING BRIEFS AND ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Section 2505.04 of the Ohio Revsied Code states that an appeal is
perfected when written notice of appeal is filed with the lower court,
that no appeal shall be dismissed without notice to the appellant, and that
no step required to be taken subsequent to the perfection of the appeal

is jurisdictional The Supreme Court has held that this section applies to
both civil and criminal cases.' 03 Another section,'" 4 expressly applicable
to criminal appeals, seems to require that the appellants brief and assignments of errors be filed simultaneously with the transcript. One court
of appeals had held that the statute imposed a mandatory requirement
and that a motion to dismiss an appeal would be sustained for failure to
comply with this requirement. 0 5 The same court, relying on an intervening Supreme Court of Ohio decision that the section is directory only,
three years later overruled a motion to dismiss an appeal for failure to
file assignments of error and a brief with the transcript' 0 6 However,
non-compliance with this requirement after notice may lead to a dismissal. In the exercise of its sound discretion the court can determine
whether additional time for filing the brief and assignments of error
should be granted, dismissing the appeal under appropriate circumstances.' 07 Another court of appeals held that its own court rules do not
apply to appeals in criminal cases and overruled a motion to dismiss for
failure to file within the time prescribed in the rule.' 0 8
' Inre Varner, 166 Ohio St. 340, 347, 142 N.E.2d 846, 851 (1956).
"'

State v. Niddes, 159 Ohio St. 353, 112 N.E.2d 531 (1953).

2OH-IO REv. CODE § 2953.04.
'State v. Rike, 145 N.E.2d 538 (Ohio Ct. App. 1953).
' State v. Martin, 145 N.E.2d 451 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956).
The Supreme Court in
State v. Niddes, supra note 101, held that the provisions of § 2953.04 are directory,
and the grant of an extension of time for filing briefs with assignment of error is
within the sound discretion of a court.
'0State v. Cook, 101 Ohio App. 222, 138 N.E.2d 436 (1955).
m State v. Weaver, 144 N.E.2d 299 (Ohio Ct. App. 1955).
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LEAVE To APPEAL

The criminal appeals statute permits appeals after the 30 day period
only by leave of the court or two judges thereof.10 9 It is the policy of
the court of appeals to grant leaves to appeal only after a showing of
good cause. Ex Parte Hertz 10 held that a motion asserting as its sole
ground that the petitioner learned that his sentence was illegal after he

became imprisoned does not show good cause for the granting of leave
to appeal. On the other hand, a motion for leave to appeal which was
supported by an affidavit of the defendant's mother that she was unable

by diligent effort to obtain counsel within the time to perfect an appeal
as a matter of right, presented sufficient cause for granting the motion."'
The necessity of supporting the motion for leave to appeal by ade2
quate data is illustrated by In re Striker."1 That case held that a petition
for leave to appeal in a criminal case after the statutory time has expired

will be denied where the request is not accompanied by a bill of exceptions,1 1 3 needed under the circumstances to show the existence of the

alleged errors.

Review On The Merits
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EviDENcE

Upon the hearing of the appeal, the reviewing court may affirm the
judgment, reverse it in whole or in part, modify it within limits, and
order the accused to be discharged or grant a new trial. 114 The court of
appeals in State v. Ray"15 held that it would not set aside a judgment of
the trial court where the findings in a trial before the courts were based
upon evidence which was susceptible of two views.
When the error assigned is that the verdict of the jury or findings of
OHio REv. CODE S 2953.05.
139 N.E. 2d 645 (Ohio Ct. App. 1953).
'State v. VanHoose, 142 N.E.2d 668 (Ohio Ct. App. 1954).
'101 Ohio App. 455, 140 N.E.2d 620 (1956).
' The court relied very heavily upon the decision of the Supreme Court in State v.
Edwards, 157 Ohio St. 175, 105 N.E.2d 259 (1952), in which the charge was made
that the court of appeals abused its discretion in refusing to grant leave to appeal.
There was no bill of exceptions filed. Only the transcript of the docket and journal
entries with the original papers, were presented to the court of appeals in support of
the motion. The court held that there was no abuse of discretion under the circumstances. Court appointed counsel failed to appeal within 30 days, and new counsel
entered the case later and filed the motion about 4 months after the final order in
the trial court. Court appointed counsel had never laid a foundation for a bill of
exception at the trial.
OHIo REv. CODE § 2953.07.
fS 102 Ohio App. 395, 143 N.E.2d 484 (1956).
"
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the court in a trial without a jury, is against the weight of the evidence,
it is the duty of the court of appeals not to weigh the evidence but to
determine whether there exists in the record the degree of proof which
the character of the case requires and render its judgment according to
that determination."16 The work of the court of appeals for the period
under review produced several examples of affirmances" m or reversals""
based on sufficiency of the evidence.
State v. Geghan" 9 considered judgment which the court of appeals
should properly render when it appears that there was sufficient evidence
to go to the jury but insufficient evidence to support a verdict of guilty.
In this case, the trial court had overruled a motion for a directed verdict
and the court of appeals had reversed and ordered the accused discharged.
The Supreme Court held that the sole function of the court of appeals,
under these circumstances, when it unanimously concludes that the verdict was not supported by sufficient evidence, is to set aside the judgment
of the trial court and remand the cause for a new trial.
When the evidence shows the defendant is not guilty of the degree
of crime for which he was convicted, but guilty of a lesser degree or a
lesser included offense, the court of appeals may modify the verdict or
finding accordingly and affirm the judgment below as modified.' 20 State
v. Hrynczyn12 1 is a good example of this nile in action. The accused was
prosecuted for murder in the second degree. He presented a plea of self' Cooper v. State, 121 Ohio St. 562, 170 N.E. 355 (1930). This was a murder
case in which there was little conflict in the evidence. Thus, it was not a situation
in which the jury and trial judge were better qualified than a reviewing court to determine the truth. It was therefore a case in which the court of appeals had a duty
to determine whether there was proof beyond a reasonable doubt, if it believed all
of the evidence of the state and disbelieved all of the evidence of the defense favorable to the defendant, and so considering it, if there was doubt whether deliberation
and premeditation had been proven by the degree of proof required in criminal cases,
it had a duty to reverse and remand. The Supreme Court then proceeded to enter
the judgment which the lower court ought to have entered.
u7 State v. Nooks, 143 N.E.2d 872 (Ohio Ct. App. 1955); State v. Titak, 144 N.E.2d
255 (Ohio Ct. App. 1955); State v. Mays, 139 N.E.2d 639 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956);
State v. Martin, 145 N.E.2d 451 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956).
' State v. Brien, 102 Ohio App. 204, 139 N.E.2d 640 (1956); State v. Kersey, 102
Ohio App. 467, 143 NE.2d 871 (1956). In the latter case, the court determined
that the prosecution had wholly failed to prove a violation, and it reversed and entered final judgment discharging the defendant from custody.
166 Ohio St. 188, 140 N.E.2d 790 (1957). It is necessary, of course, that the
reviewing court have first determined that there is sufficient evidence to have raised
a jury question as to the defendant's guilt.
'"OHIO REv. CODE § 2953.07, authorizes the court hearing the appeal to modify
the judgment as provided in § 2945.79 (D). This is not a power limited to the
court of appeals. This section expressly states that the power extends to any court
to which the cause may be taken on appeal
139 NE.2d 466 (Ohio Ct App. 1957).

